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Chapter 2 CLASSICAL VIEWS AND HISTORICAL CONDITIONS The doctrine of jihad was developed in
the first three centuries of Islam, and was influenced by the political structure of the
day. We argue in this chapter that the ideas and doctrines advanced by
early Muslim jurists were shaped, on the one hand, by the political organization of the
Islamic polity, which recognized the moral autonomy of the various religious and ethnic
communities that comprised it, and, on the other hand, by the imperial politics of
Byzantine. The classical doctrine of jihad, and its corollary theory of the
Two Territories, are the products of their time, and should be understood as such. Classical Doctrine of JihadAlthough the rules and principles pertaining to relations between
Islamic and non-Islamic states date back to the early Madinan period, the Islamic
classical doctrine of war and peace was developed by Muslim jurists (fuqaha) during the
Abbasid era. The tenets of the doctrine can be found either in general law corpora under
headings such as jihad, peace treaties, aman, or in certain special studies such as al
Kharaj (land tax), al Siyar (biography/ history), etc. The work of the Muslim jurists
consists mainly of rules and principles concerning the initiation and prosecution of war,
rules and principles that have been predicated on a specific perception of the role and
objectives of the Islamic state in respect to other states. Classical Muslim scholars often equated
the notion of jihad with that of war. The conception of jihad failed to capture the full
range of its rich meaning, thereby reducing in effect the act of jihad into the act of
war. While the Qur'an often uses the word jihad in reference to the act of war, it gives
the term broader meaning. The term jihad was first introduced in the Makkan
Qur'anic--verses (29:6,69) and (25:52)--long before the Muslims were permitted to fight.
In the Makkan period, the term jihad was used in reference to the peaceful struggle in the
cause of God:
These three verses direct the Muslims to
patiently persevere in the face of Quraysh persecution and oppression, and to use
propaganda and means of persuasion to reach out and expand the truth of Islam. It follows
that fighting and using military tactics is only one of several avenues through which the
duty of jihad can be discharged. The methodology of jihad includes, among other things,
peaceful resistance and perseverance against oppression and tyranny, if the general
conditions of the moment indicate that this approach is the most effective way to achieve
the objectives of the Muslim community. The classical doctrine of war and peace
is founded on three essential propositions: 1. The world is
divided into two territories: dar al lslam (the territory of Islam), the area subject to
Islamic law, and dar al Harb (the territory of war), the area not yet brought under
Islamic rule. (al Shafi'i adds a third territory, dar al 'ahd or the territory of
covenant. His third category however is superfluous, for he stipulates that a non-Islamic
state may enter into a peace treaty with the Islamic state only if it renders an annual
tribute jizyah; this stipulation puts him therefore on the same footing with other
classical writers). 2. The dar al lslam is under permanent jihad obligation until the
dar al Harb is reduced to nonexistence. Jihad is, thus, the instrument of the Islamic
state to propagandize Islam and expand the territory wherein Islamic law is enforced.
3. Peaceful coexistence between dar al
lslam and dar al Harb is possible only when the latter renders an annual tribute of jizyah
(poll tax) to the former. The classical doctrine of war and peace
has persisted over the centuries with few minor and sporadic alterations. The tenets of
this doctrine have been handed down unchallenged, despite several grave flaws in its
development and despite its violation of some essential Islamic principles. As will be
argued later, this may, in part, be attributed to the political conditions existing at the
time the doctrine was articulated and developed; conditions which prevailed throughout
much of Muslim history. According to the classical Muslim
jurists, a permanent state of war exists between dar al
Islam and dar al Harb. War, however, is divided into two types. First, war
of extermination against polytheists who have two options from which to choose: To either
accept Islam or be extinguished. Second, war of reconciliation against the People of the
Book who have three possibilities to face: To accept Islam and, thus, be left alone, to
pay the jizyah, in which case they are entitled to retain their religion and enjoy Muslim
protection, or to fight the Muslim army. It is clear that war, according to the foregoing
view, is the normal state of things, and that peaceful relations between the Islamic and
non-Islamic states is contingent on the acceptance of Islam by the non-Islamic states or
their payment of annual tributes to the Islamic state. War of DominationThe classical position, in response to
the principles of war and peace, has been primarily predicated on three Qur'anic verses
and on one hadith:
I have been commanded to fight the people
until they say: "There is no god but Allah." When they say that, then their
lives and property are inviolable to me, except (in the case when) the (law of) Islam
allows it (to take them). They will be answerable to Allah. The first verse, revealed in Madinah, has
been construed by some Muslim jurists and commentators as obligating Muslims to fight
non-Muslims until the latter embrace Islam in the case of the polytheists, or pay jizyah,
in the case of the "People of the Book:' In other words, the verse has been
considered as a general rule (hukm 'am) which must be interpreted in association with the
particular rules revealed in the verses (9:5) and (9:29). The verse has been interpreted,
in practical terms, to mean that non-Muslims should be either forced to accept Islam or be
dominated by the Islamic state. Yet the immediate and direct interpretation is that the
Muslims should fight non-Muslims until the latter cease attacking or persecuting them. The second interpretation is not only more
plausible and coherent, but also the only possible explication (ta'wil) of the verse when
read in its context.
The verses begin by commanding Muslims to
fight those who initiate war against them, emphasizing that Muslims should never be the
aggressive party. The term 'udwan, translated here as "aggression," is used in
the Qur'an to indicate the instigation of hostility.
Some jurists claim that the verse, "fight in the cause of Allah who
fight you. . ." is abrogated (mansukh) by the verses of Surah Bara'ah, a claim
rejected by other jurists and scholars, including Ibn 'Abbas, 'Umar ibn 'Abd al 'Aziz,
Mujahid, and others, who assert that it is firm rule(muhkam). Al Tabari, who also holds
that the verse is not abrogated, chooses the interpretation of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al 'Aziz,
who construed the verse to mean: "Do not fight those who do not fight you, meaning
women, children, and monks."l0 Although 'Umar limits the application of this verse
only to women, children, and monks, the verse itself provides a general rule which
includes those who do not fight or show hostility against Muslims. As it will be argued
later, the particularization (takhsis) made by 'Umar, had not been induced by the
statement of the text ('ibarah al nass), but rather by historical and practical
considerations. The next verse (2:191) posits the reason
for which the Muslims had been instructed to declare war against the Pagan Arabs, i.e., to
avenge the wrong inflicted by the latter who had fought the Muslims, driven them out of
their homes, and persecuted them for professing Islam. The final verse (2:193), prescribes the
objective of war as the neutralization of the oppressive regimes that prevent people from
choosing their belief and religion. It is clear from this verse that war should be carried
out against the individuals and institutions that practice oppression and persecute
people; not to force and coerce people into Islam. The same verse, therefore, instructs
the Muslims to terminate the fighting as soon as this goal has been achieved. In other
words, the previous four verses prescribe fighting only against oppressors and tyrants who
use force to prevent people from freely professing or practicing their religion. Let us now examine the verses of Surah
Bara'ah, which some Muslim jurists consider to be the final words of the Qur'an concerning the principles governing the initiation
of war vis-a-vis non-Muslims. Jurists are divided as to whether these verses abrogate
other Qur'anic verses that address the initiation of war. Those who claim that the verses
abrogate other verses on the subject base their judgement on the grounds that these verses
embody general rules which cancel any other preceding rules. The abrogation, thus, is not
predicated on textual evidence (nass), but rather on reasoning and speculation. It follows
that the question of abrogation is a matter of opinion and, as such, is subject to
discussion and refutation. "If there exists a dispute among the Muslim scholars as to
whether a specific rule is subject to abrogation," al Tabari explains, "we
cannot determine that the rule is abrogated unless evidence is presented." Needless
to say, al Tabari means by evidence, a statement provided by the Qur'an or the Sunnah in
support of the claim of abrogation. Otherwise the evidence is but another scholar's
opinion. The verses of Surah Bara'ah explicitly
declare that the Muslims are to fight the polytheists until they embrace Islam:
The word mushrikin (sing. mushrik) in
this context indicates specifically the Pagan Arabs l3 as it can be inferred from the
first verse, which reads:
The reason for this all-out war against
the Pagan Arabs was their continuous fight and conspiracy against the Muslims to turn them
out of Madinah as they had been turned out of Makkah, and their infidelity to and
disregard for the covenant they had made with the Muslims:
It could be said that what matters here
is not the specific circumstances of the revelation, but the general implication of the
text, as it is generally accepted in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Usul al
fiqh). The response for this argument is that the particularity (takhsis) of the previous
verse is determined not by the circumstance of its revelation, but by its intent (hikmah
al nass), which is also generally acceptable for limiting the application of the text.
"It should be noticed," 'Abd al Wahhab Khallaf wrote,
Therefore, the verses 1-14 of Surah
Bara'ah can be applied only to Pagan Arabs who lived at the time of the Prophet. The
reason they had to be coerced into Islam was that they were hostile to Muslims and had
disregarded their oaths and plotted against the Islamic state in Madinah. This
understanding is reinforced by the verse (9:4) exempting those who were faithful to their
treaties with the Muslims:
The previous argument can be also applied
to the hadith: "I have been commanded to fight people until they declare that there
is no god but Allah." The word "people" here implies the Pagan Arabs only.
For if the word is interpreted to be all-inclusive, the rule embodied in this hadith
should be also applied to the Byzantine Christians and the Persian Zoroastrians (majus).
But since this is not the case, the word "people" has an exclusive meaning and
implicates only the Pagan Arabs. This explication is supported by another hadith reported
by 'Abddullah ibn 'Umar ibn al Khat tab, who narrated that the Prophet (SAAS) said:
Clearly the word "people" here
implies only the Pagan Arabs who, according to Surah Bara'ah are to be forced to accept
Islam. For obviously the word cannot be considered to include all people, since that
contradicts the Qur'anic directions, as well as the practice of the Prophet, which permit
the "People of the Book" to maintain their religion. Regarding the word
"people" to be all-inclusive will, therefore, violate the provisions that have
been given to the "People of the Book" by the Qur'an and Sunnah. AbuHanifah and his pupil AbuYusuf contend
that only Pagan Arabs are to be coerced into Islam. In his book Al-Kharaj, AbuYusuf
relates that al Hasan ibn Muhammad said: "The Prophet, peace be on him, consumated a
peace treaty with the Zoroastrians of al Hajar on the terms that they pay jizyah, but did
not permit (Muslims) to take their women in marriage or to eat their slaughtered
animals." He also stated that jizyah may be collected from all polytheists, such as
Zoroastrians (Majus), Pagans, Fire and Stone Worshipers, Sabians (Sabi'iyin), but not from
apostates or Pagan Arabs, for the latter group are to be coerced into Islam. Al Shafi'i and Malik also contend that jizyah can
be taken from polytheists. War of ReconciliationWe have seen in the foregoing discussion
that the war of domination in which people are to be coerced into Islam did have a
particular ruling (hukm khass) limited to the Pagan Arabs, for their hostility and
infidelity. Most leading jurists, including Abu-Hanifah and his two renowned students
AbuYusuf and Muhammad ibn al Hasan, as well as al Shafi'i and Malik, advocate only the war
of reconciliation, in which the "People of the Book" and non-Arab polytheists
can enter into peaceful treaties with Muslims, provided they pay an annual tribute of
jizyah to the Islamic state. The war of reconciliation is therefore considered by these
jurists as a general rule applicable to all non-Muslims. Muslim jurists, thus, divide the
world into two territories, dar al Islam and dar al Harb, and declare that a permanent
state of war exists between the two until dar al Harb is annexed to dar al Islam. This
understanding is founded on verse 29 of Surah Bara'ah.
The first outstanding remark about the
verse is that it is not all-inclusive, and, thus, does not render a general rule. The
verse posits four criteria for those who are to be fought among the "People of the
Book": Those who do not believe in Allah, do not believe in the last day, do not
uphold that which is forbidden by Allah and his Messenger, and do not acknowledge the
religion of truth. The verse, obviously, has not been phrased in away that would implicate
the "People of the Book" as a whole l9, but in away that sets aside a particular
group of the "People of the Book." The general rule (hukm 'am) was derived
by the Muslim jurists by explication de texte (ta'wil al nass). Al Mawardi, for example,
implicates the "People of the Book" by arguing:
It is clear that al Mawardis reasoning
stems from neither the letter of the text, nor from its spirit. Rather, the argument
presented by al Mawardis, as well as other classical jurists, has been influenced by the
factual circumstances and practical conditions, a question discussed in some length below.
From the foregoing discussion we can
conclude that the phraseology of the verse (9:29) provides a particular rule (hukm khass);
i.e., war in this verse is prescribed against a particular group of the "People of
the Book" because of the four criteria cited above. We can also conclude that the
extension of the application of these criteria to the "People of the Book" as a
whole is not based on textual evidence (nass)' but on reasoning and argumentations; and
that the interpretation provided by classical jurists is debatable. Nevertheless, I will
not attempt here to reinterpret the verse in consideration, nor will I go into a lengthy
discussion as to whether the four criteria may implicate the "People of the
Book" in general, because it will be shown later that the Prophet (SAAS), as well as
the first generations of Muslims, did not extend these criteria to the "People of the
Book" as a whole. Instead, I will elaborate on the condition, which obligates the
Muslims to terminate their offensive against the "People of the Book":
"Until they pay jizyah with willing submission and feel themselves subdued."
Jizyah has not been levied on the
"People of the Book" for the purpose of increasing the income of the Muslim
state or promoting the wealth of the Muslim community. Nor is it levied to place financial
burden on non-Muslim individuals and force them to accept Islam; for the amount of jizyah
is very minimal and levied only on financially capable males, while exempting women,
children, monks, or poor non-Muslims. Rather, jizyah has a symbolic bearing only, and aims
to subdue hostile states or oppressive regimes so as to assure Muslim individuals that
they can propagate Islam in that community, and to assure non-Muslims that they can
profess Islam without being persecuted or harassed. "The purpose of jizyah," al
Sarakhsi proclaims,
In other words, jizyah is intended to
assure freedom of expression for Muslims to propagate Islam in non-Muslim territories and
freedom of belief to those who may choose to embrace Islam. Because jizyah was aimed at turning hostile territories into friendly ones, the Muslims did not collect jizyah from those who expressed a friendly attitude toward them, or entered a mutual alliance with them, pledging thereby their military support. Al Tabari, for example, reported in his treatise on history that Suayd ibn Muqrin entered into an agreement with a non-Muslim community which read in part: "Whoever of you provides services to us will get his reward rather than paying jizyah, and you are secured in your lives, property, and religion, and no one can change the provisions of this agreement. Suraqah ibn 'Amr, likewise, signed a treaty with the Armenians in 22 AH/642 AC, in which the latter were exempted from paying jizyah for supporting the Muslims militarily. Habib ibn Muslimah al Fahri, the deputy of Abu'-Ubaydah, also signed a treaty with the Antakians in which the latter were exempted from jizyah in return for services and help rendered to the Muslims. It was also reported in Futuh al Buldan that,
It is clear from the foregoing examples
that the early Muslims regarded jizyah as a measure for neutralizing hostile political
communities and opening their territories to Muslims, and not a measure for dominating
them or placing financial burdens on them. The previous perception of the real intent of
jizyah is demonstratable, in a yet clearer fashion, in the friendly relations between the
Islamic state and Ethiopia during the early Islamic epochs. Peaceful Coexistence: Abyssinia and IslamThe relationship between Abyssinia and the early Islamic state is an excellent case study for rebutting the classical conception of the two territories (dar al Islam and dar al harb), which calls for a permanent war against non-Muslim political communities until they accept Islam or pay jizyah. Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the Maliki school of law, advised that the Muslims should not conquer Abyssinia predicating his opinion on a hadith of the Prophet: "Leave the Abyssinians in peace so long as they leave you in peace." He acknowledged that he was not sure of the authenticity of the statement, but said: "People still avoid attacking them." |
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| Copyright © 2001 Louay Safi |