Louay M. Safi
FROM HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE TO
CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE - 4
CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
Proponents of absolute universalism premise their arguments on either of the following
two presuppositions: (1) that the notion of culture ? i.e. a normative system supported by
a set of values and beliefs commonly accepted by a group of people ? is irrelevant to the
debate on the meaning and desirability of human rights, or (2) that human rights are
compatible with a set of moral values commonly shared by all cultures. I argue in this
section that the first premise is erroneous, and contend that for the common values to be
universally valid, a non-hegemonic cross-cultural dialogue must take place among
representatives of various moral communities. Scholars who deny the relevance of culture
to the human rights debate usually favor a unilinear view of history that equates
moral with technical superiority. According to this view, human cultures form a continuum
in which primitive cultures represent one extreme while modern culture represents the
other. Primitive cultures are seen to be lacking not only in technology, but in morality
as well. Primitive cultures are described as barbaric and savage, while modern culture is
seen as refined and civilized. History, from a unilinear viewpoint, is nothing but the
movement from the primitive to the modern which forms the end of history. The logical
conclusion of the conception of history as modernization is that modern culture is the
measure of all cultures. The problem with this conception, though, is that it fails to
account for important historical events. The unilinear conception of history fails, for
instance, to explain why the European culture was more vibrant and developed ?
politically, philosophically, and artistically ? during the Roman civilization than in
medieval times. From the modernization perspective, culture is not relevant to the debate
on human rights because there is nothing for modern culture to learn from other cultures.
Modern culture should set the standards for both moral and technical action, and them pass
then on to less developed cultures.
This is in essence the conclusion of a leading advocate of radical universalism in a
chapter published as part of an edited book entitled Human Rights in Cross-Cultural
Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. Taking exception to the idea of a cross-cultural
consensus on human rights, she writes:
In this chapter I have argued against the enterprise of surveying world cultures
and religions in order to establish consensus on human rights that would answer charges
that such are a Western Creation. To look for an anthropologically based consensus on the
content of human rights is to miss the point. There may be aspects of agreement worth
noting among what many societies take to be fundamental to a life of dignity and what the
modern notion of human rights includes as its content. The concept of human rights is not
universal in origin, however; and it cannot be located in most societies.
Granted that an elaborate set of rights, purporting to protect the individual against
an excessive or arbitrary use of power by the state, was first articulated by the modern
West, one should not dismiss cross-cultural consensus as irrelevant. For even if we were
to assume that the West could learn nothing from non-Western cultures, a cross-cultural
dialogue would still be needed to understand the implications of applying a set of
extremely abstract rights in various socio-political milieus. Such an understanding should
help expand the margin of tolerance for cultural differences, and the appreciation of the
complexity of cultural reform and the need to allow this process to run its natural
course.
Other proponents of absolute universalism concede that human rights is a cultural
concept, and acknowledge the need for a cross-cultural basis for the claim of universal
validity. One interesting proposal has been advanced by Bassam Tibi in the form of
international morality to be "shared by all civilizations." Noting
Huntington’s warning against an impending "clash of civilizations", Tibi
underscores the vitality of international morality for binding the various
"civilizations" in a peaceful pact. He rightly points out that "human
rights cannot be established internationally on the basis of overall universalism but
rather on such cross-cultural foundations for a universal morality." He further
emphasizes the importance of "unbiased cultural dialogue and inter-cultural
communication," freed from the limiting concerns of foreign policy and national
interests. It turns out, however, that the cross-cultural dialogue he envisaged does not
involve a true cross-cultural exchange, but rather a one-sided intellectual exercise that
aims at addressing the question of "what ought to be done to make Muslims speak the
language of human rights in their own tongue?"
It is obvious that an absolute universalistic stance is incompatible with
"unbiased cultural dialogue," even when the proponents of such a stance truly
desire this dialogue. A coercive discourse in which the proponents of one of the
contending points of view feel justified by their strategic positioning to dictate on
others their own morality cannot be called a cross-cultural dialogue, but rather a
hegemonic discourse. A true and meaningful dialogue requires that the parties involved be
truly interested in understanding the opposing views, and are involved in "a
completely open and reciprocal form of discursive interaction." The transition from a
hegemonic discourse to a cross-cultural dialogue requires, therefore, more than the
manipulation of linguistic usage. The transition requires change in attitude and approach,
from one that relies on power relationship to one that depends on rational interaction,
or, to use Habermasian categories, a transition from a strategic speech act whose aim is
to advance the interests of the powerful actor, to communicative speech act, whose goal is
to influence the actions of others by appealing to their rational sense. Put more
precisely, for the transition from a hegemonic discourse, denoting a strategic
interaction, to a true cross-cultural dialogue, signifying a communicative interaction, to
take place, three preconditions must be met: (1) the universalism of human rights must be
established objectively, (2) the moral autonomy of the various national and cultural
communities that form the world community must be recognized and respected, and (3) the
self-righteous claim by any cultural group of the superiority of its moral system must be
rejected.
Arguments for the universality of human rights invoke, more often than not, the subjective
rather than the objective dimension of universalism. Subjective universalism is
monological because it takes "the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation
occurring in the individual mind." Subjective universalization process follows the
pattern set by Kant in the form of the Categorical Imperative: "Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law." From a Kantian point of view, a rule can be universal if it passes the test of
the reciprocity principle, viz. if the person who adopts the rule as a maxim for his/her
action is willing to be treated by others according to the same rule. The principle of
universalization as formulated by Kant is a subjective principle that can have a universal
validity only in so far as others share the same moral subjectivity with the moral actor.
Put differently, the Kantian principle of universalization, which takes the form of a
subjective process of generalization, can work only in a homogenous culture in which
people share common intersubjectivity. However, as soon as one moves into a world
characterized by cultural pluralism, say a world which resembles the international
society, a different principle of universalization would be needed. Here, a new version of
the Categorical Imperative, such as the one formulated by Thomas McCarthy, would be more
relevant:
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a
universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing
its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without
contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal
norm.
McCarthy’s reformulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, inspired by
Habermas’s
Communicative Action, reflects an implicit realization of the increasing cultural
fragmentation of modern consciousness. If the stipulation of explicit agreement for the
fulfillment of communicative action is relevant to cultures that share common
intersubjectivity, it is more urgent in a cross-cultural dialogue. Needless to say that
agreements and disagreements in the context of rational dialogue requires rational
justification, and not simply the assertion of preference and choice.
A cross-cultural dialogue has two aims. First, it helps reduce apprehension, which may
result from excessive speculation and extrapolation from one culture to another, and
clarify cross-cultural misreading and misunderstanding. Secondly, it enriches internal
debates in a particular culture by communicating different experiences, and the critical
insights of outsiders. The value of a Tocqueville’s critical insight into democracy
in America, or a Schacht’s critical analysis of Islamic law cannot be overstated.
However, for a true dialogue to take place and to be maintained with a reasonable degree
of objectivity, the interlocutors should recognize the moral autonomy of other cultural
groups. This means that the solidarity of external groups with the substantive views
of one of the internal groups locked in moral and political struggle should not be allowed
to take priority over the principle of justice.
HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL REFORM,
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
For human rights principles to take hold in the social and political practices of a
political community, these principles must be rooted in the cultural outlook and moral
commitments of its members. In societies where human rights violations are rampant, such
violations may partially be attributed to the lack of cultural sensitivities and
commitments, and partially to authoritatian regimes which have little or no respect to
human rights. In these societies enforcement of human rights requires a vibrant cultural
reform and vigorous political struggle. It follows that human rights, cultural reform, and
political participation are locked forever in a three-sided dialectical relationship. Each
of the constituting components of the above relationship does influence, and is in turn
influenced by, the others. This process has been working slowly but surely in Western
societies since the Protestant Reformation took place few centuries ago. The
democratization process should go hand in hand with cultural reform and increased
sensitivity to human rights.
As I argued earlier, a similar process has been going on in Muslim societies for little
over a century now. However, the reformation process in Muslim societies has been
complicated by both direct and indirect influences of the outside world. Intervention of
Western powers in the internal affairs of Muslim countries, whether in the form of
colonialism and direct military intervention, or in the form of unlimited support to
authoritarian regimes, has disturbed the historical process of cultural reform and
political liberalization and democratization. During the Cold War, military dictators
received tremendous financial and military support allowing them to become completely
independent from the influence of internal politics and popular support. And as long as
these regimes cooperated to advance the national interests of their respective patrons
they could act with impurity against their people. The human rights of the people were
considered secondary to the interests of superpowers. They were invoked only insofar as
they could be used to advance the national interests of the power that be.
In the Muslim world, cultural reformation is facing stiff resistance from authoritarian
regimes, intent on suppressing the egalitarian and liberating ethos of reform movements.
The suppression of freedom of expression and association by authoritarian regimes in the
Muslim world is responsible, not only for the stifling of cultural debate essential for
reform, but also for the rise of Islamic radicalism. It is not uncommon for radicals to
point to the selective application of human rights ? popularized as double standards
— to justify their rejection and to foster public cynicism.
International human rights are articulated as a means for protecting individual dignity
against an arbitrary power, and to allow a distinct minority to exercise
self-determination. Any attempt by external powers to bring about legal change contrary to
the moral values of a people through the agency of an authoritarian regime in the name of
human rights amounts to a coercive act of moral imperialism, and would make mockery of the
very notion of human rights. Human Rights scholars who are concerned about cultural
practices which are in contradiction of human rights should engage indigenous cultures
through an open dialogue to both effect change and understand the source of limitations.
It should also, and perhaps in the first place, focus on exposing efforts by external
powers to maintain authoritarian regimes so long as the latter are willing to protect
their "national interest", even when the support extended to anti-democratic
regimes amounts to inflicting great pain and suffering on countless human beings crushed
under the abusive schemes of their rules.
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