HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CULTURAL REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM SOCIETY:
FROM HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
TO CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
Louay M. Safi
Cross-cultural dialogue is a recurring theme in international human rights literature.
Some human rights scholars underscore the need for a cross-cultural discourse for
transmitting human rights concerns and practices to non-Western societies, while others
dismiss the call for engaging non-Western cultures in a dialogue as counterproductive,
since it can only lead to compromising the universality of human rights. The purpose of
this paper is to point out inconsistencies in the work of some leading human rights
scholars, involved in assessing human rights trends in the Middle East, who advocate a
cross-cultural approach to understanding human rights in non-Western cultures. I argue
that a close examination of what is referred to as a cross-cultural dialogue reveals
unmistakable elements of hegemonic discourse. It is quite evident that many human rights
scholars specializing in the study of Islam and the Middle East are not engaged in a
two-way communication with Islamic reformers, so that a better understanding of the
context and direction of Islamic reform may be attained, but rather in a hegemonic
discourse whose effect has been the overshadowing of a reformist discourse rooted in
Islamic worldview.
I stress, however, that the distorted picture that comes out of this hegemonic
discourse does not stem out of any malicious intent to mislead, but rather is due to
conceptual and methodological reasons. Methodologically, the approach to studying human
rights situations in the Middle East is ahistorical and static, failing to detect actual
developments in discourse and practice, and unable hence to reveal the vigorous cultural
reform currently underway in the Muslim world. Conceptually, the distortion in the picture
of the human rights debate in the Middle East is due to the fact that observations are
filtered through an absolute-universalistic outlook, oblivious to the importance of the
notions of culture, cultural variation, and cultural dynamism on understanding human
rights situations.
I further contend that while Islamic reform has a long way to go before it can ensure
individual liberty and equality for all, it has been moving slowly but consistently toward
a vision of an open, egalitarian, and tolerant society, and that it has already embraced
international human rights as defining principles of its vision of future society. I
conclude by identifying the preconditions for a genuine cross-cultural dialogue, and
cautioning against attempts to subvert human rights by employing human rights as a tool to
justify imposition of external values and choices, rather than an instrument for fighting
coercion and imposition.
THE MAKING OF A HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
The value of scholarship derives from its ability to bring meaning and enlightenment to
the lives of people, and to sharpen their understanding of the complex world in which they
live. All scholars realize that in order to bring about clear understanding, and to
explain actions and events in the complex world of humans, this world must be reduced into
a managable set of concepts. However, for a complex world to be reduced without
distortion, scholars must take special care to maintain balance among the various elements
and componants that constitute it. The failure to maintain balance, say by failing to
reflect the size and significance of the various forces locked in an intellectual or
political struggle, is bound to bring about misunderstanding rather than understanding,
and to create an ugly image out of the most beautiful object of understanding. Distortion
is thus the most fatal act a scholar can commit.
The importance of human rights lies in the instrumental role they play to protect the
weak against the powerful, and to liberate the oppressed from their oppressors. It is
widely accepted by human rights scholars that the right to free speech is needed not to
protect those who celebrate the praise of the established power, but to make room for
dissending views and opinions. It is therefore embarrassing, even disheartening, to see
human rights scholars siding with oppressive regimes against their oppressed subjects by
ignoring the actual abuses of the former, while condemning the latter on the ground of an
immaginary legal system they supposedly intend to resuscitate as soon as they shack off
their yokes, and obtain commanding power.
Now, combine the above two scenarios in the discourse of human rights scholars who are,
wittingly or unwittingly, involved in distorting reality and using human rights to justify
cultural imperialism and penetration, and you end up with a potentially devistating
discourse entitled "Islam and human rights". To be fair to the participants in
this discourse, the debate over the compatibility of Islam with human rights is still far
from
reaching the state of affairs described above, and it is not difficult to see that there
are few hopeful signs, which, if pursued seriously, could shift the direction of the
current debate towards more fruitful and promising ends. Among the promising signs are the
notion of cross-cultural dialogue on human rights, and the notion of human rights based on
international morality. But unless such notions are pursued seriously, it is only a matter
of time before we arrive at the dreadful scenario described above, whereby scholarship and
human rights become instruments for subjugation and control, and the hope of a more caring
world in which might is truly restrained by right is completely dashed.
Indeed, even at this relatively early stage of the discourse on Islam and human rights,
one can see that a strategic formation of an essentially hegemonic discourse is already in
the making. Central to any hegemonic discourse – or strategic discursive formation
– is the recasting of the subject of the study (in this case the attitudes and values
of the adherents of Islam) in such a manner that the strategic interests of the hegemonic
culture is advanced vis-à-vis other cultures. That is to say, the main effect of the
formation of a hegemonic discourse is not understanding the other, but justifying actions
that aim at its subjugation or elimination. The other is presented in such a negative
image that the discourse recepients resign to the idea that it is utterly useless to
listen to it, or engage it in any meaningful dialogue. As I argue below, the negative
presentation of the other does not necessarily stem from a malicious intent to distort the
facts. Rather, distortion is often the outcome of the strategic positioning of the scholar
in a particular culture, which makes him or her more susceptible to the particular
interests and historical experiences of the social group to which he or she belongs, and
the tendency to evaluate other cultures and groups though notions and theories derived
from these particular experiences and interests.
While there is no shortage of academic works that display a clear pattern of hegemonic
discourse, I have made a careful decision to exclude the works of scholars who have openly
advanced a prejudicial arguments, and to focus my analysis on examples taken from the
writings of moderate scholars who have presented relatively more balanced views on the
subject. One such an example can be found in Ann E. Mayer’s highly acclaimed work on
Islam and human rights. The main thesis in her work is that contemporary Islamic human
rights schemes borrow their substance from international human rights, but use
shari’a to limit human rights applications. Since historical shari’a
discriminates, she argues, against women and non-Muslims, limiting human rights by
shari’a rules is tantamount to cancelling out the protections they intend to ensure.
To demonstrate her thesis, Mayer examines four documents (the Iranian Constitution, the
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, al-Azhar’s model constitution of an
Islamic state, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights) and two works by Muslim
traditionalists (Mawdudi and Tabanda). Mayer discusses in detail the views of Muslim
traditionalists, and shows that they have wholeheartedly accepted historical shari’a,
opposing any efforts to reinterpret Islamic sources in ways that would lead to recognizing
the right of all people — regardless of their religious, gender, or ethnic
distinctions — to equal freedom. She rightly concludes that Islamic human rights
schemes are effectively undermined when read through the eyes of traditionalist spokesmen
of Islam. By relying extensively on the traditionalist interpretations of
shari’a Mayer is, therefore, able to make a persuasive case to support her thesis.
Her persuasiveness is attained, however, at the expense of sacrificing clarity, and
omitting crucial facts. One such a crucial fact missing in Mayer’s work is the
intense debate currently underway between Islamic reformers and traditionalists on the
relevance of pre-modern shari’a to modern Islamic society. Indeed, Mayer herself
realizes, in the context of critizing the use of shari’a for defining the scope of
individual freedom in the Iranian Constitution, the slippery nature of her arguments, and
poses an important question that goes into the heart of her contention:
Could it not be the case, one might ask, that the Islamic qualifications on rights
might be narrower than the ones permitted under international law, that these clauses
could be interpreted to mean that the government would have to produce much stronger
justifications for curbing human rights than it would under secular criteria? That is, one
might say that the assumption that broad Islamic qualifications on rights imply the
erosion of rights protection is only that — an assumption.
Mayer immediately dismisses the doubts raised in the above question, insisting that
"[a] lthough in the abstract this question might seem justified, there are
indications that warrant the assumption that these qualifications are designed to dilute
rights." She goes on to cite three grounds for her contention: (1) that the Iranian
government excludes
"[l]iberal Muslims with strong commitments to human rights, like Mehdi Bazargan and
Muslim clerks like Taleghani, who believe that Islam protects individual rights and
freedoms…," (2) that Middle Eastern governments in general are "hostile to
claims on behalf of individual liberties and the rights of the citizens," and (3)
that there is "no developed tradition of Islamic human rights protections."
Yet it is not difficult to show, on a closer examination, that the grounds cited by
Mayer are fragile, and do not warrant her assumption. Thus the first point she advances
supports the contention I raised earlier that she is relying on traditionalist
interpretations
of shari’a while obscuring the role of Islamic reformers in bringing about profound
sociopolitical change to Muslim society. For Mehdi Bazargan is himself a leading figure in
the Islamic reform movement that contributed to the demise of the authoritarian regime of
the Shah. He was a member of the committee that drafted the Iranian Constitution, and the
first prime minister in post-revolution Iran. He continued to work toward the creation of
an open, egalitarian, and tolerant Islamic society after he was pushed to the opposition
by the traditionalist policies of the Ayatollahs until his death. His efforts, and those
of other Islamic reformers, gave rise to a vibrant reform movement, opposing the
conservative regime in Iran. The movement has recently succeeded in dislodging the
conservatives from the executive branch, bring more moderate government under Khatami.
Similarly, to argue that Middle Eastern governments are "hostile to claims on
behalf of individual liberties" is to miss the point. For one needs only to remember
that these regimes embrace the ideologies of developmentalism — in their both
nationalist and socialist forms — which justify forced assimilation and cultural
imposition, the very ideologies that gave rise to Islamic reform movements. These
governments are, by and large, avowedly antagonistic to Islamic reform, and have rejected
in the past all attempts to base social development on Islamic values on ethos. The recent
efforts on the part of some Muslim governments to incorporate certain elements of
historical shari’a into the law are aimed at gaining the support of traditionalist
jurists in their struggle against Islamic reformers.
Finally, Mayer’s contention that there is "no developed tradition of Islamic
human rights protections" is perplexing, and illustrative of a legalistic approach
that lacks sensetivity to cultural dynamism. For while it is true that historical
shari’a does not support a full-fledged system of human rights protection in modern
society, Islamic reformers have been actively engaged, since Afghani and Abduh, in efforts
to reform traditional shari’a, as it is shown bellow. Still, it is inaccurate to
suggest that one cannot find principles, laws, and doctrines that can provide strong
foundation for Islamic human rights tradition. Indeed, as early as the second century of
Islam (eighth century) Muslim jurists have recognized the rights of non-Muslims to equal
protection of the law as far as their personal safety and property are concerned, as well
as their right to full religious freedom. Thus Muhammad bin Hassan al-Shaybani, the author
of the most authoritative classical work on non-Muslim rights, states in unequivocal terms
that when Muslims enter into a peace covenant with non-Muslims, "Muslims should not
appropriate any of their [the non-Muslims] houses and land, nor should they intrude
into any of their dwellings. Because they [have become] party to a covenant of peace, and
because on the day of the [peace of] Khaybar, the Prophet’s spokesman announced that
none of the property of the covenanters is permitted to them [to Muslims]. Also because
they
[non-Muslims] have accepted the peace covenant so as they may enjoy their properties and
rights on par with Muslims." Similarly, al-Shaybani concedes that Christians who have
entered into a peace covenant with Muslims have the right to practice their religion and
maintain their Churches, and are entitled to trade freely in wine and pork in their own
towns, even though trade in, and consumption of, the two items is prohibited to Muslims
under shari’a rules.
Evidently, Mayer’s assumption that shari’a rules are bound to effect
excessive restrictions on Islamic human rights schemes rests solely on reading these
schemes through the eyes of the traditionalists, while keeping the views of reform-minded
Muslim scholars and activists in the background. Indeed, leaving crucial facts and
evidence out, while conveniently focusing on radical and traditionalist elements of
Islamic resurgence are characteristic of those human rights scholars who have been quick
to dismiss the profound Islamic reform currently underway in Muslim societies, and to
overlook its
anti-traditionalist stance and liberal tendencies and ethos.
Similarly, scholars engaged in hegemonic discourse often water down the negative impact
of the self-serving foreign policies of major Western powers on cultural reform, and on
the maturation of human rights traditions. Thus Bassam Tibi dismisses the selective
application of human rights by Western powers as irrelevant to the debate on human rights
practices in the Middle East, and rejects the complaint of non-Western critics against
selective application as mere polemics. He goes further to dennounce non-Western
opposition to Western hegemony as unwarranted resistence "disguised as a claim to
cultural authenticity". Tibi does not stop even once to ask: whence comes this
hostility? Nor does he seem interested in finding out whether the non-West is resisting
the principles of human rights themselves, or only Western interpretations of the mode and
scope of their application. In fact Tibi seems to be completely oblivious to the
possibility that non-Western hostility might have to do with the support Western powers
lend to oppressive non-Western regimes, ruled by hated dictators. The hegemonic nature of
the intellectual discourse in which Tibi is engaged is so pervasive that it turns out that
even the notion of "cross-cultural consensus" he vigorously advocates does not
involve a dialogue among autonomous cultures engaged in rational persuasion, but a
coercive discourse that takes the form of monologue through which non-Western cultures are
expected to learn the manners and habits of a presumably morally superior West.
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